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CASE NOTES
By refusing to declare such provisions void as against public policy,
courts have left it within their power to decide each case on the equities
involved. If the equities favor the insurance company, a literal interpre-
tation of the provision will be deduced, thereby requiring manual de-
livery. Otherwise, the provision will be interpreted liberally and con-
structive delivery will suffice.
NEGLIGENCE-UNQUALIFIED DUTY REASONABLY TO
INSPECT BEFORE SALE IMPOSED ON
USED CAR DEALERS
The defendant, a seller of used cars, sold an automobile with defective
brakes. The auto went out of control because of this defect, while being
driven by the buyer. Plaintiff, a third party, sustained injuries from the
accident, for which he brings this action against the vendor. Verdict
was rendered for the seller; plaintiff moved for a new trial which was
granted; on retrial, a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and
seller appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the trial court.
In affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, with
three justices dissenting, held that a dealer in used automobiles must
exercise reasonable care in inspecting an automobile before sale; also,
the tort liability of a dealer in used automobiles is based on foreseeability
of injury to others, arising from his actions or failure to act, and does
not depend on the dealer's representations, or knowledge of the defective
condition. Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W. 2d 627 (Ky., 1954).
The liability of a supplier of chattels to a third person not in privity
of contract for damages resulting from defects in the chattel has been a
field of much adjudication. Initially, it was held that the breach of a
contract gave no cause of action for damages to a party not in privity.1
This rule was extended to actions in tort, and the general rule developed,
that the original seller is not liable for damages caused by defects to
anyone except to his immediate buyer.2 Although some exceptions to
the rule developed, it was the general rule until 1916 when Judge Car-
dozo laid down the modern rule in the leading case of McPherson v.
Buick Motor Company.8 This decision placed the duty upon a manu-
facturer to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of chattels which,
if negligently made, became dangerous instrumentalities. The majority
of the courts have adopted this rule to impose a duty of reasonable care
1 Vinterbottom v. Wfright, 10 A . & 1,V. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842).
2 Prosser, Torts § 83 (1941).
.1217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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upon automobile manufacturers. 4 The remainder of the courts have either
rejected the rule or modified it.5
However, the courts did not so readily impose the same unqualified
liability upon used car dealers for injuries suffered by a third person
caused by defects in the automobile. One view taken by the courts is that
liability would only attach when the dealer represented that the car
had been reconditioned, when in fact there was a defect which could
have been discovered upon reasonable inspection.6 Another view taken
by the courts is that liability for injuries to a third party attaches when
the seller has knowledge of any defect and fails to inform the buyer.7
And finally, some jurisdictions have held that a lack of privity between
dealer and the third party is a bar to an action by the third party.8
The decision in the instant case removes the necessity for the third-
party plaintiff to prove that the seller had knowledge of a defect and
concealed such defect from the vendee; or that the automobile was
represented as being reconditioned. But more important, it appears that
the court would impose liability upon the dealer who sells a car "as is,"
4 Hupp Motor Co. v. Wadsworth, 113 F. 2d 827 (C.A. 6th, 1940); Goullon v.
Ford Motor Co., 44 F. 2d 310 (C.A. 6th, 1930); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co.,
261 Fed. 878 (C.A. 2d, 1919); O'Hara v. General Motors Corp., 35 Fed. Supp. 319
(E.D. Mich., 1940); Miles v. Chrysler Corp., 238 Ala. 359, 191 So. 245 (1939); Rotche
v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934); Hechel v. Ford Motor Co., 101
N.J.L. 385, 128 Ati. 242 (S. Ct., 1925); Ritz v. Packard Motor Car Co., 261 App. Div.
908, 25 N.Y.Supp. 2d 213 (2d Dept., 1941); Quakenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App.
Div. 433, 153 N.Y.Supp. 131 (3d Dept., 1915).
5 Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 17 Fed. Supp. 615 (W.D. Olda., 1936). This
decision releases a manufacturer from liability to those not in privity. Cohen v.
Brockway Motor Truck Corp., 240 App. Div. 18, 268 N.Y.Supp. 545 (Ist Dept., 1934).
This decision refused to extend the rule in the McPherson case to those defects
which made danger "possible, but not probable."
6 Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F. 2d 373 (C.A. 8th, 1939); McLeod v. Holt
Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N.W. 479 (1940); Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 213
N.C. 775, 197 S.E. 757 (1938); Bock v. Truck & Tractor, 18 Wash. 2d 458, 139 P. 2d
706 (1943); Flies v. Fox Brothers Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928). The
court in the Flies case uses language very similar to the decision as laid down in the
instant case. But it qualifies the rule by stating that a duty to exercise reasonable care
in inspecting the vehicle exists "especially" where by representation or warranties
that the article is safe, the seller induces the sale. As the facts were that the car had
been rebuilt and such representations had been made, it is only a matter of conjec-
ture that the court would have applied the rule set forth in the instant case had such
representations and warranties not been made.
7 Bergstressor v. Van Hoy, 142 Kan. 88,45 P. 2d 855 (1935); Barni v. Kutner, 6 Terry
850, 76 A. 2d 801 (Super. Ct. Del., 1950),; Trust Company of Chicago v. Lewis Sales,
Inc., 306 Ill. App. 132, 28 N.E. 2d 300 (1940).
8 Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 17 Fed. Supp. 615 (W.D. Okla., 1936);
Shepard v. Kensington Steel Co., 262. 111. App. 117 (193 1); Gordon v. Bates-Crumley
Chevrolet Co., 158 So. 223 (C.A. La., 1935). Although the'court in the Trust Com-
pany of Chicago case, supra, discussed the rule as laid down in the Shepard case,
the decision was based on other grounds.
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that is, makes no representations as to its condition and has no knowledge
of any defect, if it was in a dangerously defective condition which
could have been discovered by reasonable inspection. This position, the
courts have been reluctant to take, predicating liability either upon
knowledge of a defect, or upon the dealer's affirmative act of represent-
ing the car as reconditioned. 9
The court in the instant case relied mainly upon two decisions. 10 In
the Standard Oil Co. v. Leaverton" case the fact situation differed mater-
ially from that in the instant case. There, the defendant allowed another
person to use a vehicle with defective brakes in order for the other per-
son to try out the automobile with a view toward buying it. While using
the automobile the brakes failed to work, and the car damaged property
belonging to the plaintiff. The court ignored previous decisions regard-
ing used car dealers' liability to third parties and based its decision upon
three cases, 12 which were concerned with and decided upon the liability
of a bailor of a chattel for injuries suffered by a third party due to de-
fects in the chattel. One of these cases was Vaughn v. Millington Motor
Co., 13 which stated:
This duty (to exercise reasonable care to avoid putting forth a machine with
defects) does not rest upon the contract of a bailment, but arises from the obli-
gation which the law imposes upon every man to refrain from acts of omission
or commission which he may reasonably expect would result in injury to third
persons.14
Although this rule is specifically applied to one who lends automobiles
in the course of business, it appears that the court in the instant case feels
that it is not too harsh to impose the same duty upon one who sells
automobiles without taking affirmative steps to recondition or repair
them, that is, one who sells them "as is."
A portion of the facts in the Thrash v. U-Drive-It5 case were almost
identical to those in the instant case. The court, in ruling upon that
phase of the case, stated:
... when a dealer in second hand or used motor vehicles sells a used car which
he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, is imminently dan-
9 Authorities cited notes 6 and 7 supra. However, a recent decision released a seller
of a used car from liability in tort to the vendee who took the car "as is" without
guarantee. Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W. 2d 720 (1954).
10Standard Oil Co. v. Leaverton, 239 Mo. App. 284, 192 S.W. 2d 681 (1946);
Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 93 Ohio App. 388, 113 N.E. 2d 650 (1951).
11239 Mo. App. 284, 192 S.W. 2d 681 (1946).
12Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 217 Ala. 621, 117 So. 72 (1928);
Spelky v. Kissel-Skiles Co., 54 S.W. 2d 761 (C.A. Mo., 1932); Vaughn v. Millington
Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197, 22 S.W. 2d 226 (1929).
13 160 Tenn. 197, 22 S.W. 2d 226 (1929).
14 Ibid., at 198 and 227. 1593 Ohio App. 388, 113 N.E. 2d 650 (1951).
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gerous to life or limb when put to ordinary use, without notice to the pur-
chaser of its defects or bad qualities,'6 or when, by representations and war-
ranties that the vehicle is in good operating condition, he or it induces the
sale, such dealer is liable to any person who suffers an injury as a proximate
result of a defective condition of the vehicle (existing at the time of the sale)
when said vehicle is being used for the'normal purpose for which it is de-
signed.17
This rule seems to do little more than state the law as held in previous
cases, and although it does charge the dealer with constructive knowl-
edge of ascertainable defects, it implies that the liability can be discharged
by informing the vendee of any known or discovered defects. This deci-
sion does not, as in the instant case, unqualifiedly impose a liability on a
seller of used cars for injuries suffered by a third party due to defects
which could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care.
The rationale adopted by the court in the instant case for this broad
rule is, that ". . . the used car dealer is in a better position, by reason of
his opportunity, than his average customer, to discover what defects
might exist in any particular car to make it a menace to the public."',,
The decision in the instant case, as pointed out in the dissenting opin-
ion, represents a reversal of previous holdings in Kentucky. Although
there is no prior case in this jurisdiction involving liability of a used car
dealer, it had been held that a maker of automobiles was not liable to a
third person not in privity of contract for defects in the automobile
unless the dealer knew of the defect which made the automobile dan-
gerous and concealed the defect or represented that the automobile was
in good condition. 19 In addition, it had been held that a vendor of articles
not inherently dangerous did not have a duty to make an inspection of
the article before sale.20
Although the decision stated by the majority opinion is attempting
to accomplish a worthwhile objective, there are criticisms voiced in the
dissenting opinion which merit consideration, especially in view of the
fact that the court is apparently imposing a duty, not only upon the
dealer who sells the automobile as reconditioned or who conceals knowl-
edge of a defect, but also upon the dealer who takes no affirmative steps,
selling the car "as is" without knowledge of any defect. The dissenting
opinion questions the decision as being vague and indefinite in so far
as it does not state whether the rule applies only to dealers or to anyone
16 Italics added.
'7 Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 93 Ohio App. 388, 393, 113 N.E. 2d 650, 655 (1951).
18 268 S.W. 2d 627, 629 (Ky., 1954).
'9 Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911).
20Rankin v. Harlan Retreading Co., 298 Ky. 461, 183 S.W. 2d 40 (1944); Peaslee-
Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm., 148 Ky. 265, 146 S.W. 770 (1912).
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who sells a used car. Furthermore, the decision does not state whether
the dealer can release himself from liability by telling the vendee that
the automobile is in defective condition, or that it has not been inspected
for defects (although the dissenting opinion feels that the necessary im-
plication is that there is an absolute duty to inspect and correct such
defects as might prove dangerous to third parties). Finally, the dissent
points out that the decision does not state whether this duty extends
to dealers in other second hand merchandise such as farm tractors, road
machinery, cook stoves, and the like. Although these questions seem
unduly searching in view of the fact that the court ruled specifically
upon the duty of used car dealers, and the duty of dealers in other second
hand merchandise is not in issue, it is still problematical whether the
dealer can release himself from liability by informing the vendee of a
defect or by informing him that no inspection had been made.
On the question of vagueness of the majority decision, the dissent
rather dramatically stated:
When a court sets itself up as an instrument of social progress and embarks
on a crusade, it should not merely shoot a scatter gun in the general direction
of a supposed target. The shots should be zeroed in with some degree of accu-
racy and innocent bystanders should be given reasonable opportunity to re-
move themselves from the line of fire.21
In view of the fact that the questions posed by the dissent must be
answered, it appears that the court, by placing this vague, unqualified
duty upon used car dealers, has also broadened the field of litigation be-
tween used merchandise dealers and third parties not in privity where
the article sold, if defective, becomes a dangerous instrumentality.
POWERS-PARTITION GRANTED PRIOR TO TER-
MINATION OF EXECUTOR'S POWER OF SALE
Testatrix died in 1938 leaving a one-third interest in the annual gross
rents of her farm to her husband as long as he remained unmarried. The
remainder was left to her four children equally in fee simple with a
power of sale in her executors, which power was to last for five years
after the termination of her husband's interest. A devisee of one of the
remaindermen sued for partition in 1952, which was only two years after
the death of the husband. The defending executors moved to strike, alleg-
ing that the plaintiff had no interest to which a suit for partition would
attach. They alleged that they as executors became invested with legal
title as trustees, and that an equitable conversion occurred leaving the
remaindermen as equitable owners of personalty. The Illinois Supreme
Court in allowing partition held that in the absence of an imperative
21 268 S.W. 2d 627, 631 (Ky., 1954).
